

Message Text

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 03761 01 OF 03 152332Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----152337Z 012640 /64
O 152227Z MAY 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7379

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 3761

NODIS/STADIS

FOR TARNOFF (S/S) FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, XF, US
SUBJ: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO
ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE DRAFT OF A BRIEFING MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY FOR HIS MIDDLE EAST TALKS WITH GROMYKO. IT IS AN ELABORATION OF A DRAFT PREPARED BY PETE DAY AND CLEARED BY JACK ARMITAGE AND INCORPORATES SOME IDEAS IN A MEMORANDUM FROM MARK GARRISON TO MARSHALL SHULMAN DATED APRIL 29. IT SHOULD BE RECLEARED TO THE EXTENT TIME PERMITS AND PUT IN FINAL FOR THE SECRETARY TO HAVE ON HIS RETURN TRIP TO GENEVA TUESDAY. PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE ARE THREE ATTACHMENTS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE TABBED IN IN THE DEPARTMENT:

A. ATTACHMENT 1 - MOSCOW 6636.

B. ATTACHMENT 2 - NSC PAPER BASED ON APRIL 19 PRC MEETING.

C. ATTACHMENT 3 - SECTO 4023 SENT FROM LONDON.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

TO: THE SECRETARY

FROM: NEA - ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.

SUBJ: MEETING WITH GROMYKO: MIDDLE EAST

OUR OBJECTIVES

-- KEEP THE SOVIETS SUFFICIENTLY HAPPY WITH OUR
DIALOGUE ON THE MIDDLE EAST SO THAT THEY WILL NOT MAKE
TROUBLE.

- THIS WILL INVOLVE AT A MINIMUM GIVING GROMYKO A
FAIRLY FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR CONSULTATIONS TO DATE WITH
MIDDLE EAST LEADERS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR BRIEFING HIM
ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ASAD.

- IT MAY ALSO INVOLVE AGREEING TO COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE
THAT GOES A BIT BEYOND PREVIOUS COMMUNIQUE WITH THE
SOVIETS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. (I WILL WORK UP SOME
POSSIBLE FORMULATIONS BEFORE THE TALKS BEGIN).

- YOU COULD ALSO GIVE GROMYKO OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS
OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS, WHICH WE
SHOULD RECEIVE ON MAY 18.

-- AVOID COMMITTING OURSELVES AT THIS STAGE TO ANY-
THING AS SPECIFIC AS SETTING A DATE FOR GENEVA OR
INITIATING JOINT U.S.-SOVIET EFFORTS TO WORK OUT FOR-
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MULAS ON SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS (E.G., THE
SOVIETS MAY PRESS THEIR IDEA OF A FORMULA FOR
"SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION" BY ISRAEL AND THE PLO).

-- PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO KEEP THE HEAT ON THE PLO
TO MODIFY ITS POSITION WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE
AND RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338.

-- PRESS THE SOVIETS TO WORK ON LIBYA AND IRAQ TO
MODIFY OR AT LEAST MUTE THEIR REJECTIONIST POSITION AND
ACTIONS.

-- OBTAIN FROM GROMYKO AS FULL AN ACCOUNT OF SOVIET
TALKS WITH THE ARABS AS THEY EXPECT FROM US. (GROMYKO
WILL BE MEETING WITH FAHMY IN EUROPE JUNE 9-10.)

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

-- OBTAIN U.S. AGREEMENT TO ONE OR MORE OF THE

FOLLOWING:

- SETTING A DATE FOR RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.
- COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE REFLECTING INCREASED JOINT U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION AND GREATER SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7380

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 GENEVA 3761

NODIS/STADIS

FOR TARNOFF (S/S) FROM ATHERTON

- JOINT U.S.-SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRAFT FORMULAS ON SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES, PERHAPS INVOLVING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.S.-SOVIET "WORKING GROUP" OR THE BEGINNING OF "TECHNICAL TALKS."

- A U.S.-SOVIET MEETING WITH WALDHEIM ON THE MIDDLE EAST, OR EVEN A U.S.-SOVIET-WALDHEIM DECLARATION DEALING WITH BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES, ALTHOUGH THIS IS UNLIKELY IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD WALDHEIM, E.G., THAT WALDHEIM SHOULD BE AN OBSERVER AND NOT A PARTICIPANT.

BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

IN YOUR MARCH 29 DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW WITH GROMYKO ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, HE WENT OVER IN FAMILIAR TERMS SOVIET VIEWS ON THE KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF A SETTLEMENT, SAYING THAT HE PREFERRED TO LEAVE TO THE FUTURE THE QUESTION OF TIMING AND ORGANIZING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

IN YOUR RESPONSE, YOU SAID YOU LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING

HIM LATER IN GENEVA TO AGREE ON STEPS TO CONVENE THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE. THERE WAS ONE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION
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TO WHICH WE HAD TO SEEK A SOLUTION, YOU SAID: THAT WAS
THE CURRENT REFUSAL OF THE PALESTINIANS TO RECOGNIZE THE
RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST AS A NATION. YOU HOPED GROMYKO
WOULD USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE PLO TO ELIMINATE THE
PERTINENT PROVISION FROM ITS CHARTER. YOU AGREED WITH
GROMYKO THAT THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION
WAS IN LARGE PART FOR THE ARABS TO SOLVE. GROMYKO SAID
IT WOULD BE EASED IF WE COULD CHANGE OUR POSITION REGARDING
PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION WHETHER IT WAS IN A SINGLE
OR A SEPARATE DELEGATION. YOU REPLIED WE WANTED TO DIS-
CUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE ARABS, WHICH WE WOULD HAVE
DONE BY THE TIME YOU MET GROMYKO IN GENEVA. YOU ASSURED
GROMYKO DURING THE CONVERSATION WHAT WE WOULD KEEP MOSCOW
INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF OUR TALKS WITH THE ARABS.

WE UNDERSTAND THE SOVIETS DID RAISE WITH ARAFAT,
DURING THE LATTER'S RECENT TRIP TO MOSCOW, THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE PLO SIGNIFYING ITS ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL. GROMYKO
TOLD MAC TOON LAST WEEK THAT THE SOVIETS HAD THE IMPRESSION
"THAT THE PALESTINIANS ARE Milder," ALTHOUGH THE PLO WAS
NOT READY TO STATE ITS WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. HE SAID THEY HAD RECOMMENDED TO
THE PLO, THE SYRIANS AND THE EGYPTIANS THE IDEA OF
SIMULTANEOUS PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI MUTUAL RECOGNITION.
(TOON'S REPORTING TELEGRAM IS AT ATTACHMENT 1.)

AT THE APRIL 19 PRC MEETING, THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT
OUR STRATEGY WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE TO GET THEM MORE
CLEARLY COMMITTED PUBLICLY TO THE PEACE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS AND TO INDUCE THEM TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS THAT
WILL FACILITATE THAT PROCESS. SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS PRO-
POSED THAT WE SHOULD TELL THE SOVIETS WE BELIEVED THEY
SHOULD MOVE IN THREE AREAS:

-- PRESS THE PLO TO FACILITATE A SOLUTION TO THE
PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION PROBLEM;
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-- RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL;

-- LEAN ON THE IRAQIS AND LIBYANS TO ABATE THEIR

OPPOSITION TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

I ATTACH (ATTACHMENT 2) THE PAPER THAT WAS PREPARED FOR
THE NSC AS A RESULT OF THE PRC MEETING.

I BELIEVE THAT AT THIS STAGE WE SHOULD TREAT ALL
THREE OF THESE TOPICS IN A GENERAL WAY, WITHOUT PROPOSING
SPECIFIC FORMULAS TO THE SOVIETS ON THE PALESTINIAN
REPRESENTATION QUESTION OR ELABORATING VERY MUCH ON THE
OTHER TWO SUBJECTS.

IF GROMYKO PRESSES FOR MORE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS
AT THIS TIME (E.G., A DATE FOR GENEVA, REPRESENTATION
FORMULAS, JOINT WORKING GROUPS), PERHAPS THE BEST TACK
TO TAKE IS THAT:

-- ANY SUCH STEP BEFORE THE ISRAELIS HAVE COMPLETED
THEIR GOVERNMENT-FORMATION PROCESS WOULD BE INJECTED
INTO THE ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESS AND STRENGTHEN
THE HARDLINERS.

-- WE BOTH NEED A BETTER FEEL OF THE VIEWS OF THE
PARTIES - I.E., FROM OUR LATER TALKS WITH THE NEW ISRAELI
PRIME MINISTER AND GROMYKO'S MEETING WITH FAHMY.

-- WE NEED TO GIVE THE ARABS MORE TIME TO WORK OUT
THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES ON THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION
ISSUE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7381

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 GENEVA 3761

NODIS/STADIS

FOR TARNOFF (S/S) FROM ATHERTON

POINTS TO BE MADE TO GROMYKO

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW MET WITH ALL THE LEADERS OF THE PRINCIPAL ARAB GOVERNMENTS EXCEPT FAUHD, WHOM HE WILL BE SEEING IN A FEW DAYS.

-- THERE ARE STILL MAJOR GAPS BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ON THE MAJOR ISSUES OF WITHDRAWAL AND BORDERS, THE NATURE OF PEACE AND A PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT. YOU COULD BRIEF GROMYKO AT THIS POINT ON OUR IMPRESSIONS FROM OUR CONSULTATIONS TO DATE WITH MIDDLE EAST LEADERS AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ASAD (OUR BRIEFING TELEGRAM ON THE ASAD MEETING IS AT ATTACHMENT 3).

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE CONVENING OF A GENEVA CONFERENCE LATER THIS YEAR, BUT WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT IT BE CAREFULLY PREPARED AND THAT THERE BE SOME FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON BEFORE THE CONFERENCE MEETS. FOR A CONFERENCE TO FAIL WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

-- IT IS ALSO CLEAR FROM OUR TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS
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THAT THERE IS STILL NO CONSENSUS AMONG THEM ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION QUESTION. WE AGREED WITH THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR THE ARABS IN LARGE PART TO SOLVE.

-- FOR OUR PART, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT SO LONG AS THE PLO DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST AND ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, IT IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE PARTICIPANT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON OTHER QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ISSUE, SUCH AS WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A UNITED ARAB DELEGATION OR A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, WE OURSELVES DO NOT HAVE STRONG VIEWS. THE ISRAELIS DO NOT FAVOR A UNITED ARAB DELEGATION. THE SYRIANS AND JORDANIANS DO FAVOR IT, THOUGH THE JORDANIANS DO NOT REJECT THE IDEA OF PALESTINIANS ON A JORDANIAN DELEGATION IF THE OTHER ARABS AGREE. THE EGYPTIANS PREFER NATIONAL DELEGATIONS, AND HAVE LOOKED FOR WAYS TO DEAL WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION THROUGH CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PLO AND JORDAN AND AGREEMENT ON A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN LINK BEFORE GENEVA.

-- WITH THE CONTINUED ARAB DIFFERENCES ON THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION QUESTION, WE AND THE SOVIETS AS CO-CHAIRMEN MAY HAVE A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY. THE

SOVIETS SHOULD DO ALL THEY CAN WITH THE PLO TO URGE THEM TO COOPERATE WITH THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS IN REACHING A FORMULA THAT WILL PERMIT THE CONFERENCE TO BE CONVENED.

-- THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WILL BE ADEQUATELY DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT ANY SETTLEMENT MUST INCLUDE A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND, THOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE PARTIES ON THE NATURE OF THAT HOMELAND. IT WOULD BE MOST REGRETTABLE THEREFORE, IF THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION OF HOW THE PALESTINIANS ARE TO BE REPRESENTED CONTINUES TO DELAY, OR BLOCKS, SECRET

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NEGOTIATIONS.

-- WE ARE FULFILLING OUR RESPONSIBILITY AS A CO-CHAIRMAN IN SEEKING TO PERSUADE ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TO TRY TO ACCOMMODATE THE POSITIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE. WE LOOK TO THE SOVIETS TO DO THE SAME. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, TO BEGIN WITH, IF THE USSR WOULD DO AS WE HAVE DONE AND PUBLICLY STATE THE VIEW THAT BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS WILL HAVE TO MAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO COMPROMISE IF THERE IS TO BE A SETTLEMENT.

-- FINALLY, WE NOTE THAT TWO OF THE COUNTRIES THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS IN THE AREA--IRAQ AND LIBYA-- BASICALLY OPPOSE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND POSE A CONTINUING THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE TRYING TO MOVE TOWARD SUCH A SETTLEMENT. WE HOPE THE USSR WILL PRESS ITS IRAQI AND LIBYAN FRIENDS TO MODIFY THEIR VIEWS OR AT LEAST TO TONE DOWN THEIR ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE COURSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT THE U.S. AND USSR AS CO-CHAIRMEN ARE COMMITTED TO PROMOTE.

-- FOR OUR OWN PART, WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE IRAQIS IN VARIOUS WAYS THAT WE WOULD WELCOME AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP. EVEN IF THE U.S. AND IRAQ ARE AT ODDS OVER MANY MIDDLE EAST ISSUES, WE THINK THAT A DIALOGUE AT A MORE SENIOR LEVEL WOULD HELP EACH COUNTRY UNDERSTAND THE OTHER BETTER.

-- ONCE WE HAVE FINISHED OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, WE WILL WANT TO HAVE TALKS WITH THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WHEN ONE IS ORGANIZED - WHICH MAY TAKE UNTIL JULY. THEREAFTER, WE WOULD FORESEE A PERIOD OF ACTIVE WORK WITH THE PARTIES IN AN EFFORT TO SEE WHETHER SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT CAN BE SECRET

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REACHED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF A PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
FRAMEWORK IN ORDER FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO MEET
BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. WE WILL WANT TO BE IN
TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DURING THIS PERIOD AND
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN GROMYKO'S VIEWS ON HOW THE
NECESSARY LEVEL OF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. MOSCOW 6636
2. NSC PAPER BASED ON APRIL 19 PRC MEETING
3. SECTO 4023

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